Approved For Release 2006/10/19 : CIA-RDP80B01495R001400070006-3

CONFIDENTIAL

for White House

DDI-1079-71

28 April 1971

Mr. Kent B. Crane
Assistant to the Vice President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Kent:

The Director has asked me to thank you for the report on your meetings with Mr. Bubnov. What Bubnov has to say is very interesting but, as you have recognized, highly suspect in motivation. Our specific comments on his statements are attached.

Sincerely,

/s/
Richard Lehman
Director of Current Intelligence

Attachment:
Memorandum, Role of the Soviet Military in National Security Decisions, 28 April 1971.

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee (w/att)
1 - DCI (w/att & basics)
1 - DDI (w/att & basics)
1 - DOCI File (w/att & basics)
RLEHMAN:da:OCI: [redacted] 28April71

25X1A

NSC Review Completed

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2006/10/19 : CIA-RDP80B01495R001400070006-3

Approved For Release 2006/10/19 : CIA-RDP80B01495R001400070006-3
CONFIDENTIAL

28 April 1971

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Role of the Soviet Military in National Security Decisions

1. Soviet Embassy Counselor Bubnov's claim that the Soviet military was responsible for violations of the Middle East ceasefire and for naval activity near Cuba is false. Bubnov may have hoped that this explanation would disarm criticism of these Soviet actions and advance his major argument that the US should demonstrate flexibility to the Soviet leadership. It is possible, however, that Bubnov was not deliberately lying, but was relating misinformation given to him by his superiors.

2. Though the influence of the military on Soviet policy has been relatively strong since Khrushchev's ouster, the political authorities have kept the marshals and generals in line. The politburo continues to make the basic decisions on all important national security matters, including such initiatives as Bubnov ascribes to the military. Party and security officials continue to watch the armed forces to ensure that such decisions are properly executed.

3. Bubnov's claim that the forward movement of SAM missiles during the Middle East ceasefire was instigated by a local commander is to us inconceivable. Moscow's intelligence and internal control capabilities aside, the mere fact that the forward movement of the missiles continued over a three-month period despite US protests

CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2006/10/19 : CIA-RDP80B01495R001400070006-3

Approved For Release 2006/10/19 : CIA-RDP80B01495R001400070006-3

effectively rules out the possibility that the cheating was done without the Kremlin's knowledge and approval.

4. The Soviet decision to attempt to introduce nuclear submarines into Cuba was carefully coordinated in both Moscow and Havana. As early as November 1969, Marshal Grechko and the chief of Soviet naval operations visited Havana to lay the basis for increased naval activity. In the spring of 1970, Raul Castro met with Brezhnev and Grechko in Moscow and probably continued discussions on the subject. During 1969 and 1970 the Soviets employed several naval visits and other military operations in the Caribbean to probe Washington's reaction. In mid-August 1970, the Soviets began construction of their Cienfuegos facility. In short, Moscow's naval activity in the Caribbean in the fall of 1970 was the culmination of a carefully prepared Soviet effort to accustom the US to accept a Soviet presence in the Caribbean. This effort was clearly made with the knowledge and approval of the Soviet political leadership.

Approved For Release 2006/10/19 : CIA-RDP80B01495R001400070006-3

Approved For Release 2006/10/19 : CIA-RDP80B01495R001400070006-3

TAB

Approved For Release 2006/10/19 : CIA-RDP80B01495R001400070006-3

Approved For Release 2006/10/19 : CIA-RDP80B01495R001400070006-3

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

UNCLASSIFIED | CONFIDENTIAL | SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Director/OCI		
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

	ACTION	X	DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks:

It would be appreciated if you ~~have~~ worked a brief reply drafted on behalf of Mr. Helms that would satisfy the request made in the last sentence of the attached letter from Kent Crane. Please send copies of the response to this office and to the Director.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
	4/20/71

UNCLASSIFIED | CONFIDENTIAL | SECRET

STATINTL

Approved For Release 2006/10/19 : CIA-RDP80B01495R001400070006-3

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions (40)

Approved For Release 2006/10/19 : CIA-RDP80B01495R001400070006-3

STATINTL

TRANSMITTAL SLIP | DATE

TO:

ROOM

REMARKS:

The piece of business indicated here was undertaken by DDI folk. I am sending this along just for your info.

STATINTL

FROM:

ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55 REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)

Approved For Release 2006/10/19 : CIA-RDP80B01495R001400070006-3

Approved For Release 2006/10/19 : CIA-RDP80B01495R001400070006-3

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	The Director	20 APR 1971	
2			
3	DD/I	20 Apr 71	
4			
5	DIONE		
6	[redacted]		

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks:

1 to 3

Please deal with Cord
in re last sentence
of his letter.

[redacted]

STATINTL

STATINTL

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE

UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

FORM NO. 237 1-67 Use previous editions (40)

Approved For Release 2006/10/19 : CIA-RDP80B01495R001400070006-3

Approved For Release 2006/10/19 : CIA-RDP80B01495R001400070006-3

Executive Registry
71-1980

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

Secret

April 19, 1971

DDI-999-71

The Honorable Richard Helms
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Director:

For the record, I am enclosing a contact report on my last couple of meetings with Igor Bubnov of the Soviet Embassy.

Bubnov's description of the dominant role played by the Soviet military in the movement of missiles to the Suez Canal and the dispatch of nuclear submarines to Cuba is most interesting. I would appreciate knowing informally if the Agency is inclined to credit his explanation.

Sincerely,

Kent B. Crane
Assistant to the
Vice President

Secret

Approved For Release 2006/10/19 : CIA-RDP80B01495R001400070006-3

Approved For Release 2006/10/19 : CIA-RDP80B01495R001400070006-3

SECRET

April 14, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

During recent months, I have seen Igor Bubnov, Counselor of the Soviet Embassy, twice at his request--once for lunch at the Carlton Hotel on January 7th and again in my office on April 8th.

On both occasions, Bubnov has strongly conveyed the impression that (a) the Soviets want to reach an agreement on some of our outstanding problems, and (b)our attitude has not been sufficiently forthcoming. I was also struck by the extreme sensitivity he expressed over public attacks on Soviet policies, both in the media and by JDL activists. He fumed over relatively minor incidents: demonstrations outside the Embassy, Jewish delegations he had had to deal with, and a Congressional resolution introduced by Senator Scott and Representative Ford urging the independence of Byelorussia (he asked rhetorically whether the Republican leaders would also suggest that Texas be granted independence). Bubnov bemoaned the fact that even liberal Senators were opposing the Soviets on the Middle East: He had briefed Senator Muskie prior to the Senator's trip and found him "totally uninformed on the basic facts of the situation," and even Senator Bayh had taken to dumping on the Soviets (his actual phrase was more graphic and obscene).

In the early January meeting, he laid heavy stress on Soviet displeasure over JDL demonstrations and harassment of Soviet officials. He said his Government felt sure we could stop such activities if we really wanted to, and therefore had to assume we were trying to poison the negotiating atmosphere. I replied that the U.S. is not a police state, and therefore we could not control press comments or legal demonstrations. We certainly regretted violent illegal activities and had said so publicly. When he then implied that they felt we could turn off the violence if we really wanted to, I noted that if this were true, we certainly would have prevented similar violent and embarrassing incidents which had earlier affected our own officials.

Bubnov chided the U.S. for not being more forthcoming in our negotiating posture on a whole range of subjects. He said the 24th Communist Party Congress was coming up shortly, and it would be

SECRET

Approved For Release 2006/10/19 : CIA-RDP80B01495R001400070006-3

Approved For Release 2006/10/19 : CIA-RDP80B01495R001400070006-3

too bad if Soviet leaders decided there to change their current policy of restraint and negotiation. He said that there was still time for the Embassy in Washington to affect the foreign policy discussion at the Congress if we would just signal a more friendly attitude. I promised to convey that thought to people more directly involved in formulating our policy, but expressed the private doubt that we should be trying to play party politics in the Soviet Union.

On Bubnov's general point concerning our intransigent negotiating posture, I said we felt they were in a fine position to be more forthcoming. I added that their actions in moving missiles up to the Suez Canal and in sending nuclear submarines to Cuba just prior to our Congressional elections had not gone unnoticed. He expressed "surprise" and asked if we had really interpreted their actions in the Middle East as an insult and an attempt to sabotage the Rogers Plan. I replied that we had very forcefully signaled our displeasure about this, and we certainly hoped that they had gotten the message.

Rather surprisingly, Bubnov then said that he wanted me to know confidentially that many of his colleagues were disturbed by what had happened in the Middle East. He claimed that the missile move was instigated by the local commander of Soviet forces in the area, who had seen the cease-fire as a golden opportunity to improve his tactical position. Bubnov alleged that military men had moved the missiles forward and presented the politicians in Moscow with a fait accomple. He said that we must have experienced difficulty with our own military exceeding instructions from time to time, for instance at My Lai, and so should not find his explanation particularly unusual.

He went on to say that the military had also prompted the Cuban problem, but in his view with real justification. He claimed that the Navy had sent some ships to Cuba routinely and that we had overreacted for our own political purposes. The Soviet military leaders had then asked the politicians if the great Soviet Navy was going to have to ask American permission to visit friendly ports. Obviously, we therefore were to blame for creating circumstances in which the politicians had to permit the Navy to demonstrate its strength and ability to move about the world without interference from us. Bubnov said he did not know if their submarines were still frequenting Cuban waters, but given the trauma over the 1962 missile crisis, he doubted that any political leader would feel inclined to deny the general staff that option.

Approved For Release 2006/10/19 : CIA-RDP80B01495R001400070006-3

Approved For Release 2006/10/19 : CIA-RDP80B01495R001400070006-3

In our April meeting, Bubnov asked what we thought about the 24th Party Congress. I reminded him that Dr. Kissinger had already indicated that we were impressed with Brezhnev's conciliatory statements. We understood that their internal political problems might have required the more critical comments by Gromyko--and he added that that was also the case with Marshal Greshko's remarks. He asked if we were prepared to respond in kind to Brezhnev's initiatives. I countered by saying that we regard Brezhnev's speech as mood music which had set the stage for more specific initiatives from the Soviets. Bubnov suggested that we were in a better position to make concessions, and we had a long discussion of all the problems we both claimed we wanted to solve.

In summary, I think we agreed that (a) Vietnam presented very little room for maneuver to either side; (b) the Middle East was terribly complicated by the actions of the smaller states we had each chosen to support but did not control; (c) SALT was personally beyond us in the complexity of the issues involved, but in the final analysis the USG's problem was the question of how much confidence we dared place in a country whose military forces were growing rapidly in their capability and influence on the decision making process at home; and finally (d) Berlin seemed to offer the best opportunity for some sort of agreement, and I strongly indicated that they had very little to lose by giving Willy Brandt something in return for the concessions he appeared ready to make to East Germany.

The only bit of personal information I learned is that Bubnov is planning to return permanently to the Soviet Union after five years here. If the Ambassador's schedule remains firm, Bubnov hopes to leave in August for an assignment in the foreign ministry.

Approved For Release 2006/10/19 : CIA-RDP80B01495R001400070006-3